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Abstract
Analysis of temporal network data arising from online interactive social experi-
ments is not possible with standard statistical methods because the assumptions of
these models, such as independence of observations, are not satisfied. In this paper,
we outline a modelling methodology for such experiments where, as an example,
we analyse data collected using the Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) —
a software platform for conducting experiments that reveal how social norms and
identities emerge through social interaction. We apply our model to show that
ingroup favouritism and reciprocity are present in the experiments, and to quan-
tify the strengthening of these behaviours over time. Our method enables us to
identify participants whose behaviour is markedly different from the norm. We use
the method to provide a visualisation of the data that highlights the level of in-
group favouritism, the strong reciprocal relationships, and the different behaviour
of participants in the game. While our methodology was developed with VIAPPL
in mind, its usage extends to any type of social interaction data.
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1 Introduction
Social interaction is a driving force in shaping people’s opinions, beliefs, and behaviours.
Understanding how the emergence and evolution of social structures, such as norms and
identities, depends on social interaction is an important avenue of research in social psy-
chology, sociology, economics and related disciplines [7, 8, 22, 24, 20, 15]. Empirical
studies have shown that norms emerge through interaction, however these studies either
lack experimental control [14], or they cannot analyse how the individual interactions
produce the emergent norms [23, 21]. Typically, empirical studies produce relatively lim-
ited amounts of data, and, therefore, an important aspect of such studies is the usage of
statistical models to infer results. Of particular interest in this context is the nature of
participant-to-participant and group-level interactions, which produce temporal network
data.
VIAPPL, the Virtual Interaction APPLication, is a software platform for running so-
cial experiments in a controlled setting allowing researchers to study how social structures
emerge though social interaction (see www.viappl.org). Participants, or players, in the
experiments are avatars in a virtual game where they exchange tokens with the other
players over a number of rounds. VIAPPL games can be flexibly defined to manipulate
various features of social interaction, and here we describe a specific game that will be
analyzed in this paper. In this game players only communicate through token exchange
(not, for example, face-to-face or though a chat function on the platform), and it is this
token exchange which provides a measure of social interaction. At the end of each round,
players are presented with a network diagram of all individual player-to-player token ex-
changes from that round; the diagram also indicates group membership (since players are
randomly assigned to one of two groups at the beginning of the experiment). Players use
this information to inform their decision making in the next round, and, in this way, the
interactions between players influence behaviour and shape norms in a given game.
The data from a VIAPPL experiment is temporal network data. The observations
corresponding to one player (i.e., who this player exchanged tokens with over all rounds)
are not likely to be independent of each other, nor to those of other players: they are
interconnected since the players, exposed to the same game history, consider their own
previous actions and the actions of others when deciding on their next move. Because of
this interconnectivity, the assumptions underlying many standard statistical procedures
used in analysing more classical (static, non-network) data (e.g., t-test, ANOVA, or normal
linear regression [2, 19]), are not satisfied by VIAPPL data; thus, a new approach is
required.
VIAPPL data has been analysed previously to investigate the evolution of ingroup
favouritism under different conditions, such as inequality [9]. However, the data in that
study was aggregated, and, so, analysis at the level of individual interactions was not
possible. By contrast in this paper, we propose a modelling framework which, among
other things, incorporates this level of detail. This is achieved by linking token exchanges
between pairs of individuals in a given round through a regression model. Unlike standard
2
procedures, we do not assume a null distribution for the error terms (normal or otherwise),
but, rather, make use of a null model for player behaviour. The sequence of round-based
regression coefficients maps out a trajectory over time, enabling us to see how norms
become more or less important as the game progresses. Furthermore, we provide a method
for detecting players who have very different behaviour from the other players in a game.
Note that the proposed methodology is applicable beyond the VIAPPL setting to other
kinds of social interaction data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we describe the VIAPPL game environ-
ment in detail before discussing our modelling approach. We then apply the model to
investigate the presence of ingroup favouritism and reciprocity, and provide a method for
visualising the data based on the model. Finally, we conclude by discussing the results of
the analysis and further applications for the modelling framework.
2 VIAPPL game environment
VIAPPL, the Virtual Interaction APPlication, is a software platform for conducting ex-
periments in social psychology. Participants of the experiments are avatars in a game-like
environment and are referred to as players. They observe other players as nodes in a net-
work, as shown in Fig 1, and they interact by exchanging tokens over a number of rounds.
At the start of the game, players are randomly allocated to one of two groups, and group
membership is highlighted by the node colour. The number of tokens each player has is
indicated next to their node, with group totals shown to the left of the screen; note that,
in the game shown in Fig 1, all players start with 20 tokens. A player recognises their
own node by the thick black border, and selects a node to allocate a token (where they
may select their own node); each player allocates one token per round. The ego player in
Fig 1, who is in the purple group, has given a token to another player in the purple group
(i.e., ingroup giving), as indicated by the arrow. The token balance of the ego player is
reduced by one, while the balance of the other player increases by one.
Once all players have made their move, a new screen appears which displays all token
allocations from that round in a directed network diagram, as in Fig 2. Note that in this
instance the ego player has received a token from the player they gave their token to.
An example of self-giving can be seen by the green node at the top left of the screen, as
indicated by the self-directed arrow. Each player reviews the interactions of the round
before the next round commences.
Many of the features in the VIAPPL platform can be changed to accommodate dif-
ferent experimental setups. The initial number of tokens assigned to each player need
not be homogeneous, and may differ with respect to the group. The number of players,
groups, and players per group can also be varied. Nodes may be located anywhere on the
screen, not necessarily in a circular format. Nodes can also be different shapes or images,
allowing players to express individuality so that they may be defined beyond their group
membership. In this paper, we apply our methodology to a balanced setup like that of
Fig 1 where there are two groups, an equal number of players per group, and each player
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Figure 1: VIAPPL screen presented to a player as they select who they will
allocate a token to.
Figure 2: VIAPPL screen presented to players at the end of a round, displaying
all token allocations from that round.
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starts with the same number of tokens; however, the methodology we present can be used
in the other setups.
3 Modelling approach
As described in the introduction, individual interactions are key to the formation and
recreation of norms, and, thus, we model this data by considering the token exchanges
between pairs of individuals as the variable of interest. More specifically, we choose the
response variable Yijt to be the number of tokens player i has received from player j up
to round t. There are two fundamental norms that may occur in a VIAPPL game: re-
ciprocation, where players give more often to players they have received tokens from, and
ingroup favouritism, where players prefer to give to players in their own group. Recip-
rocation can be measured by investigating the effect of Yjit, the number of tokens player
i has given to player j up to round t, on the response Yijt. Ingroup favouritism can be
measured by investigating the effect of Gij, a binary variable indicating whether i and j
are in the same group (Gij = 0) or not (Gij = 1), on the response. Combining these two
effects, we propose the linear model,
Yijt = α + ρ Yjit + γ Gij + ǫijt, (3.1)
where α is an intercept, ρ is the reciprocity effect, and γ is the group effect, while ǫijt is
an error term. Of course, we may fit this model at several time points, t, and, indeed,
we do this in our analysis. Thus, we could highlight the t dependence in the coefficients
via αt, ρt, and γt, respectively; however, we suppress that dependence here for notational
convenience. Note that, informally, we could write the model as
“Tokens received from an individual”
= α + ρ “Tokens given to that individual” + γ “Do groups differ?”.
As was mentioned in the previous section, VIAPPL players have the option to give
tokens to themselves. However, the concepts of reciprocity and ingroup favouritism do
not apply in this case. As such, the Yiit terms need to be treated differently to the Yijt
(i 6= j) terms. The two cases — self-giving and non-self-giving — can be handled by an
extended model,
Yijt = (α + ψSij) + (ρ+ ρ
∗Sij)Yjit + γ Gij + ǫijt,
where Sij is a binary variable denoting the self such that Sij = 1 when i = j and Sij = 0
otherwise. (Note that there is no GijSij term since this is always zero.) The i 6= j case of
course returns to Eq (3.1), whereas, the i = j case becomes
Yiit = (α + ψ) + (ρ+ ρ
∗)Yiit + ǫiit
since Siit = 1 and Giit = 0. Clearly, ψ = −α and ρ
∗ = 1 − ρ to yield Yiit = Yiit (with
ǫiit = 0), and, so, these new coefficients are wholly determined by the other coefficients in
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the model. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider only the i 6= j cases, and, importantly, as
we have just demonstrated, there is no loss of information in doing so. In practice, this is
equivalent to removing the i = j elements from the dataset and fitting the model of Eq
(3.1); writing this formally, our model is
Yijt = α + ρ Yjit + γ Gij + ǫijt, i 6= j. (3.2)
3.1 Assessing significance of effects
To assess the significance of a particular effect (ρ or γ), we may specify a null hypothesis,
e.g., H0 : γ = 0 for the group effect, and, then, consider the extent to which the estimate
from experimental data, γˆ, differs from zero. Typically, in a linear model, the assumptions
of normality and independence of errors are made, which, in turn, impose a t-distribution
on the (standardised) estimated effect under the null hypothesis [19]; this result permits
straightforward significance testing.
In our setting, standard assumptions are violated due to constraints within the ex-
perimental setup (e.g., if players give one token per round, then
∑n
i=1 Yijt = t, where n
is the number of players), and the high interconnectivity of such social interaction data.
Indeed, Fig 3 shows errors from the model of Eq (3.2) fitted to experimental data at
t ∈ {10, 25, 40}, and it is clear that these are highly non-normal in all cases, but par-
ticularly in earlier rounds. Therefore, instead of specifying a null hypothesis for model
coefficients in conjunction with normally distributed errors, we specify a null model for
the underlying player behaviour. This null model approach is quite common in network
analysis [26], and has been used in the analysis of online influence and opinion evolution
[17], but is not so prevalent in social psychology; interestingly, the approach has also been
used in a range of ecology applications [10, 13].
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Figure 3: Histograms of the errors from the model of Eq (3.2) at t ∈ {10, 25, 40}
for game 1 of the data analysed in the Results section. There we analyse three
other games, but the histograms shown here are representative of what we see in all games.
We make use of a null model in which players give at random, i.e., a player has an equal
probability of choosing each player in the network to give their token to in a given round.
We simulate a game according to this null model using an agent-based model [16, 3, 4], and
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fit the linear model of Eq (3.2) to this simulated game. This procedure yields a random
draw of estimated coefficients for a null game, say, (α˜, ρ˜, γ˜), and, repeating this a large
number of times (we use 10,000 replicates for very high accuracy), provides the distribution
for each coefficient under the null behaviour. By comparing estimated coefficients from
the real data to these simulated distributions, we can assess the significance of each effect.
Note that, although we use the “giving at random” null model, it being analogous to the
hypothesis of “no effect” used commonly in statistics, the real data could be compared
to other behaviours of potential interest, e.g., a null model in which players give twice as
often to their ingroup as they do to the outgroup.
3.2 More general models
A small extension of Eq (3.2), and one which we consider in our analysis, includes an
interaction between Yjit and Gij via
Yijt = α + ρ Yjit + γ Gij + δ Gij Yjit + ǫijt, i 6= j, (3.3)
where δ adjusts the reciprocity effect in light of the group status, and vice versa.
Another extension, but not one we consider here, would be the inclusion of additional
predictor variables via
Yijt = α + ρ Yjit + γ Gij + β ·Xijt + ǫijt, i 6= j, (3.4)
where Xijt is a vector of predictors, β is a corresponding vector of regression coefficients,
and “·” is the dot product. These additional predictors could relate to the individual,
such as age or gender; to aspects of the game’s history, such as the number of tokens j
received from i over some particular window of time, Yjit2 − Yjit1; or to conditions of the
experimental setup (if results are pooled from multiple setups), such as whether or not
individuals started with the same number of tokens. Of course, Eqs 3.3 and 3.4 could
be combined by considering both Gij Yjit and Xijt, and, furthermore, other interactions
could be considered, i.e., Xijt terms with Yjit and Gij, and Xijt terms with each other.
Note that, in the above, we have chosen the response variable Yijt to be the number
of tokens that player i received from player j up to round t. However, other choices could
be made, for example, Yijt could be a binary variable indicating whether or not player i
received a token from player j in round t; in this case, a binary regression model (e.g.,
logistic or probit) would be more appropriate than a linear model, and, more generally,
one could consider other generalised linear models [18].
4 Results
To demonstrate our methodology, we consider data collected from 4 VIAPPL experiments,
each of which had a different group of 14 participants (56 participants in total). The
experiments were carried out in the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. All
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Figure 4: Proportion of tokens received from ingroup, outgroup and self in each
game.
participants provided written informed consent to participate in the study, which had
been approved by the Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee of the University of
KwaZulu-Natal. The games each had 2 groups of 7 players, and each player started with
40 tokens. At the start of the game, players were instructed to give one token per round
and were told that the game would last for 40 rounds. Since players started with 40
tokens, they could not run out of tokens at any point in the game. (These games differ
slightly from the example presented in Figs 1 and 2 in that there are more players and
tokens.)
4.1 Exploratory analysis
Before applying the proposed model to the data, we first carry out some exploratory
analysis to gain some initial insight. Here, we retain the ii data points (self-giving), but,
as described above, they are removed when applying the model.
Fig 4 shows the proportion of tokens players received from their ingroup, the outgroup
and from themselves over the course of the game. Interestingly, players receive at least
twice as many tokens on average from their ingroup as they do from their outgroup
(and recall that group membership is randomly assigned). The values of each of the
three proportions are remarkably similar across games, albeit game 3 has less self-giving
and more ingroup giving. Fig 5 displays these proportions calculated at each round.
In almost all cases, players receive more tokens from their ingroup than their outgroup.
The amount of self-giving increases slightly as time goes on in all games, and, in fact, it
increases beyond the outgroup proportion towards the end of games 1, 2, and 4.
The scatterplots in Fig 6 show the relationship between the number of tokens received
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Figure 5: Proportion of tokens received from the ingroup, outgroup and self at
each round.
and the number of tokens given over the whole course of the game, split by group. Each
point (Yij, Yji) corresponds to a pair of players (i, j), indicating that player i received Yij
tokens from player j and gave Yji tokens to player j. When referring to the whole game we
avoid writing Yij,40 for convenience. The scatterplots are symmetric about the diagonal
Yij = Yji, since, for each pair of players (i, j), there are two points (Yij, Yji) and (Yji, Yij).
In particular, cases of self-giving corresponds to the point (Yii, Yii) which, necessarily,
appears on the diagonal in Fig 6A (as it is an ingroup exchange). Points tend to be closer
to the diagonal in the case of ingroup giving (Fig 6A), indicating that players reciprocate
with members of their own group. The plot corresponding to the outgroup, Fig 6B, shows
points further away from the diagonal, indicating less reciprocation in general.
Table 1 displays the correlation coefficient between tokens received, Yij, and tokens
given, Yji, split by the ingroup and outgroup, and by game; the closer this value is to one,
the greater the reciprocity. In all games, there is a reasonably strong ingroup reciprocity,
whereas outgroup reciprocity is much weaker in games 1, 2, and 4. On the other hand, in
game 3 the outgroup reciprocity is very strong. However, this high correlation coefficient is
mainly driven by two players with unusual behaviour, and when their token exchanges are
removed it reduces to 0.08. These two players, from different groups, formed a reciprocal
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Figure 6: The number of tokens received is plotted against the number of
tokens given for (A) players in the same group and (B) players in different
groups. The × symbol indicates self-giving. The points at (38, 40) and (40, 38) in plot
(B) correspond to two players who reciprocated for almost the entirety of the game.
relationship in which they exchanged tokens in almost all of the rounds; this is quite
unlike what we observe in other players across all games. Their token exchanges are
clearly visible in the top-right corner of Fig 6B, lying far away from all other points (even
when compared to the ingroup setting of Fig 6A); later in our analysis, these two players
are also identified as being highly unusual based on the model.
Table 1: Correlation between Yij and Yji for the ingroup and the outgroup.
Game
1 2 3 4
Ingroup 0.68 0.69 0.80 0.73
Outgroup 0.09 0.33 0.97 -0.06
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4.2 Model for the full game
We apply the linear model, described in the Modelling Approach section, to the full game,
i.e., exchanges up to, and including, the final round (t = 40). The response, Yij, is the
number of tokens player i received from player j over the course of the game. We consider
four models which are special cases of Eq (3.3):
(i) reciprocity effect only (γ = δ = 0),
(ii) group effect only (ρ = δ = 0),
(iii) additive reciprocity and group effects (δ = 0), and
(iv) interacting reciprocity and group effects.
Table 2 displays the R2 values for these four models in each of the four games. Note that
the highest R2 values are seen in game 3, but this is driven by the two anomalous players
mentioned earlier. Looking at the other games, we see that the models with additive
effects have larger R2 values than the models with only one of the two effects, whereas
the inclusion of the interaction effect increases the R2 to a much lesser extent.
Table 2: R2 for models for the full game.
Game
Model 1 2 3 4
Reciprocity Yji 0.22 0.25 0.78 0.26
Group Gij 0.24 0.29 0.08 0.23
Additive Gij + Yji 0.31 0.35 0.78 0.33
Interaction Gij ∗ Yji 0.33 0.35 0.79 0.37
Fig 7 displays the coefficients for the interaction effects models, along with histograms
of the coefficients obtained from the simulated (null model) data. Note that the interaction
term is within the 95% bounds for games 1, 2, and, 3, and only just outside of these bounds
for game 4, i.e., the interaction effect is not strong as was also suggested by Table 2. We
therefore consider the additive effects models in more detail; Fig 8 displays the coefficients
against the reference null distributions, and Table 3 provides the numeric values of these
coefficients along with p-values computed based on the null distribution. It is clear the
group effect is strong and highly significant statistically, with players in games 1, 2, and 4
receiving approximately two fewer tokens on average from outgroup members than ingroup
members. The reciprocity effect is not as strong, but it is still highly significant for all
four games; its positive value indicates that players receive more tokens from players they
give tokens to. Again it is clear that the behaviour in game 3 differs from the others, with
a group effect which is non-significant (at the 5% level), and a much stronger reciprocity
effect.
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Table 3: Coefficients for the additive effects models. P-values are in brackets next
to the coefficients.
Game
1 2 3 4
Intercept 2.960 (0.787) 3.010 (0.656) 0.600 (<0.001) 2.770 (0.757)
Yji 0.310 (0.001) 0.290 (0.004) 0.870 (<0.001) 0.370 (<0.001)
Gij -1.950 (<0.001) -1.960 (<0.001) -0.420 (0.106) -1.990 (<0.001)
4.3 Model for each round
While the previous section focused on the exchanges over the whole game, i.e., t = 40,
we now fit the various models, but at all time points t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 40} to analyse the
evolution of the effects over time. Fig 9 displays the R2 for each model at each round. We
see that the R2 values are generally increasing over time, suggesting that the behaviour
becomes more predictable, perhaps as players settle into some normative behaviour. It
is also clear that, over essentially all time points, the additive effects models improve on
the single reciprocity and group effects models, while the interaction effects models are
only slightly better than the additive effects models; the exception to this is game 3 (the
unusual game) in the earlier rounds where the interaction effects models do appear to
improve the fit (albeit this is not the case in the latter rounds).
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Figure 9: R2 for each model at each round.
The coefficients for the additive effects models over each round are shown in Fig 10.
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For games 1, 2, and 4, the group effects are significant at almost all rounds, i.e., the
norm of giving to the ingroup is apparent from the outset. Moreover, since the group
effects get further away from the 95% bounds with time, this behaviour strengthens with
time. By contrast, the reciprocity effect is non-significant in the earlier rounds, i.e.,
it takes longer for individuals to build reciprocal links. Indeed, recall from Fig 6 that
individuals reciprocate more with individuals from the ingroup. This, in combination
with the fact that the group effect is established much earlier in the game, perhaps
suggests that the group membership provides a context for reciprocal links to develop.
The coefficients, and their trajectories over time, are remarkably similar across these
three games, particularly the group effect, i.e., there is repeatability in the dynamics over
different groups of participants; of course, game 3 is quite different from the other games
with a much larger reciprocity effect, and much smaller (non-significant) group effect
(which we consider in more detail in the next section).
0.0
0.3
0 

0 10 20 30 40
Round
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Yjit
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
0 10 20 30 40
Round
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Gij
Game
1 2 3 4
Figure 10: Coefficients for the additive effects models at each round. Solid
coloured lines are the game coefficients. Black dashed lines are the 95% confidence bands
from the simulated data. The dotted line is the average coefficient from the simulated
data for game 3 (explained in the Game 3 section), and the surrounding shaded region
displays the 95% bounds.
4.4 Game 3
Up to now we have not explicitly referred to the identity of a specific player in the
experimental data, beyond pointing out that an unusual pair of interactions exists in
game 3 (which was clearly visible in Fig 6B). Of course, there are 14 individuals in
each game, and, therefore, the player index i lies in the set {1, . . . , 14}. The numbering
of players is completely arbitrary, but, for example, we use the player’s position in the
network diagram, starting at the top node (labelled “player 1”) and moving in a clockwise
direction. Labelling in this way, in game 3, player 3 gave 38 (out of a possible 40) tokens
to player 8, while player 8 gave 40 tokens to player 3. This level of reciprocity was far
higher than between any other pairs, both in game 3 and the other games. In this section,
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we investigate the extent to which these two players contributed to the large reciprocity
effect for that game, and, indeed, the small group effect (note that these players are in
different groups).
To examine the influence of players 3 and 8 on the estimated model coefficients, we
create semi-simulated data in which these players are replaced with null players who give
at random. This data was created by artificially replaying the game, keeping all token
exchanges as per the observed data, apart from the tokens given by players 3 and 8 which
are instead allocated at random. This has the effect of altering only the values of Yi,3,t
and Yi,8,t, i.e., in the real data, Yi,8,t equals t for i = 3 and zero otherwise, whereas, in
the semi-simulated data, Yi,8,t equals t/14 on average ∀i; similarly, in the semi-simulated
data, Yi,3,t equals t/14 on average ∀i.
In total, we generated 10,000 semi-simulated datasets, and applied the additive effects
model to each. This yields a distribution for the model coefficients with the unusual recip-
rocal behaviour of players 3 and 8 removed. The average coefficients from this distribution
along with 95% bounds are shown in Fig 10 by the dotted line and shaded area. Indeed,
compared to the real game 3, the reciprocity effect is reduced, but still becomes larger
than that of the other games; this suggests that an unusual level of reciprocity exists in
game 3 even having removed the influence of players 3 and 8. Note that, in Fig 6A, there
are points in positions (17,34) and (34,17) corresponding to players 1 and 5, and points
in positions (23,22) and (22,23) corresponding to players 2 and 12; they are much nearer
to the top right corner than any other (non-self-giving) points, indicating sustained reci-
procity. These two reciprocal pairs are not as unusual as the player 3 and player 8 pairing,
since they correspond to players in the same group, and, as we have seen, ingroup giving
is normative behaviour. For this reason, the group effect in the semi-simulated game 3 is
still very strong. However, it does reduce in later rounds as the reciprocity effect becomes
stronger.
4.5 Influence metric
Players 3 and 8 in game 3 were initially identified as being unusual through the exploratory
analysis, i.e., they are clear outliers in Fig 6B. However, building on the approach used
in the previous section, we now develop a more systematic, model-based approach for
identifying anomalies by way of their influence on the model coefficients. A standard
statistical technique for identifying influential observations is to remove an observation
from the dataset, refit the model to this reduced dataset, and compute the difference
between the new and original coefficients, so-called “dfbetas” [5]; large changes in the
coefficients signify influential observations.
In our context of social interaction data, however, simple removal of observations
changes the structure of the data due to the interrelatedness of these observations. For
example, removing Yji leads to player i having given 40 − Yji tokens, whereas all others
give 40 (without the loss of generality, we mean t = 40 here and avoid the t subscript for
convenience.); removing the set of all tokens given by player i, (Y1,i, . . . , Y14,i), creates a
non-player who still received tokens; removing player i entirely creates imbalance in the
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group sizes, and, furthermore, all tokens related to this individual (giving and receiving)
become unaccounted for. These removals alter the data structure, which is why, in ex-
amining the joint influence of players 3 and 8 in game 3, we did not simply remove these
players but, rather, replaced them with simulated players. This maintains the structure
of the data where token exchanges are redistributed. Thus, in order to determine the
influence of a single player on the model coefficients, we use that approach here but with
an individual player, rather than a pair.
As in the previous section, we create a semi-simulated game where everything remains
as per the observed data apart from the actions of player i who is replaced by a null
player who gives at random. For the kth semi-simulated game we fit the model to obtain
the altered coefficients ρˆ−ik,t and γˆ
−i
k,t for t = 1, . . . 40, where the superscript “−i” indicates
that the influence of player i is removed. These coefficients map out a curve which could
be compared to those of Fig 10. However, it is not practical to view 14 altered coefficient
curves for both coefficients across four games. We therefore compute the distances between
altered and original curves using an ℓ1 norm for each simulation,
‖ρˆ− ρˆ−ik ‖1, ‖γˆ − γˆ
−i
k ‖1,
where ρˆ = (ρˆ1, . . . , ρˆ40) and γˆ = (γˆ1, . . . , γˆ40) are the vectors of original coefficients, and
ρˆ−ik = (ρˆ
−i
k,1, . . . , ρˆ
−i
k,40) and γˆ
−i
k = (γˆ
−i
k,1, . . . , γˆ
−i
k,40) are the vectors of altered coefficients for
simulation k. Then, we average these over simulations to obtain the influence metrics,
dρi =
1
N
N∑
k=1
‖ρˆ− ρˆ−ik ‖1, dγi =
1
N
N∑
k=1
‖γˆ − γˆ−ik ‖1, (4.5)
where N is the number of simulations; we use N = 10,000. In order to make these metrics
more comparable, we standardise them by dividing by the average value across all players
in the game,
dρi∑
14
i=1 dρi/14
,
dγi∑
14
i=1 dγi/14
. (4.6)
Values greater than 1 indicate player i is more influential than the average player.
These values are shown in Table 4, where we also highlight values greater than 2 as
these correspond to players whose influence is more than double the average. While there
are players with influence scores greater than 2 in all games (only just in some cases),
there are also players with scores much larger than this. In game 3, players 3 and 8 have
influence scores greater than 5 for both variables indicating that their behaviour strongly
influenced the estimated model coefficients; this is in line with our findings in the previous
section. These players were far more influential than players in any of the other games.
Interestingly, there are two players in game 4 with high influence scores. Player 6 has a
large influence score for the group effect. It turns out that this player gave no tokens to
outgroup players, and, although ingroup giving is normative, it is unusual to have avoided
the outgroup entirely (on average in game 4, players gave 8.6 tokens to outgroup players).
Player 7 has large influence scores for both effects, albeit more for the reciprocity effect
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than the group effect. This player reciprocated 35 tokens throughout the game, of which
34 were with ingroup players (on average in game 4, players reciprocated 20.6 tokens).
Table 4: Standardised influence metrics. Values larger than 2 are marked with a *
to indicate players with more influence on the model.
Player
Game
1 2 3 4
Yji Gij Yji Gij Yji Gij Yji Gij
1 0.28 0.26 0.69 0.41 0.73 0.61 0.39 0.27
2 0.91 1.30 0.59 0.62 0.50 0.42 1.63 0.43
3 2.01* 0.44 0.51 0.35 5.19* 5.44* 1.52 1.13
4 1.39 0.70 0.46 1.51 0.33 0.16 0.53 1.18
5 0.43 0.80 0.42 1.21 0.39 0.59 0.58 0.21
6 0.91 1.65 1.22 1.04 0.24 0.18 0.69 3.71*
7 1.38 0.89 1.62 0.94 0.18 0.11 3.76* 2.72*
8 1.10 0.32 1.05 1.48 5.09* 5.46* 0.27 0.21
9 0.44 0.85 1.72 0.85 0.15 0.21 0.37 0.33
10 0.25 0.80 1.23 1.68 0.16 0.16 0.84 1.27
11 0.66 0.85 0.61 0.63 0.11 0.07 1.53 0.84
12 2.52* 1.96 2.23* 0.80 0.56 0.34 0.42 0.63
13 0.59 1.85 0.96 1.69 0.09 0.05 0.37 0.32
14 1.11 1.32 0.69 0.79 0.28 0.21 1.10 0.74
4.6 Visualising the data
Fig 10 visualises the game dynamics over time, aggregated over individuals via model
coefficients. We now provide a complementary network diagram visualisation in Fig 11
which provides an alternative view in terms of how individual player’s contribute to the
aggregate normative behaviour. This is a weighted network produced based on the total
number of token exchanges between pairs of players (in either direction) by the end of the
game (albeit such diagrams could be produced at any time point in the game).
From the network diagram, we get a sense of which specific players reciprocated with
each other, the level of ingroup or outgroup giving, and how unusual players are based on
their influence score. The network layout was generated using the Fruchterman-Reingold
layout algorithm in the igraph package in R [12, 6], a force-directed algorithm which
locates nodes more closely together if their edge weight is larger.
As we would expect from our earlier analysis, there is a clear split between the two
groups, showing the tendency of players to interact more with members of their ingroup.
Players who are located more centrally in the network interacted with both groups, e.g.,
players 10 and 11 in game 1, whereas players at the periphery of the network interacted
more exclusively with their ingroup, e.g., players 2 and 3 in game 1. Of course, players 3
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Figure 11: The network of players for each game. The node colour indicates the
group while the node size relates to size of the influence scores from Table 4 (larger nodes
indicate higher scores). Edges between nodes are drawn if players exchanged tokens,
where the edge colour corresponds to the total number of exchanges between the players
in either direction (darker edges correspond to more exchanges). The size of the border
around a node indicates the level of self-giving for that player.
and 8 in game 3 stand out clearly, both due to their node size (influence score), and the
fact that they are they are located further away from other nodes. This is due to the fact
that they essentially only interacted with each other, however there are still weak links
with other players meaning that, throughout the game, other players did interact with
them to some extent. Player 4 in game 4 is also quite distinctive. This player self-gave
tokens 30 times during the game (visible in the thick border), and, much like players 3
and 8, is located further away from other nodes due to the lower level of interaction with
other players.
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5 Discussion
VIAPPL, the Virtual Interaction APPLication, is a software platform for running ex-
periments to study how social norms and identities emerge through social interaction.
VIAPPL data has been analysed previously, but in an aggregated form which did not pre-
viously allow the effect of individual interactions to be studied [9]. We have introduced
a modelling framework that includes this individual level detail. Our models indicate
that ingroup favouritism is a prominent normative behaviour which emerges right from
the outset of the game; this is in agreement with [9]. We have additionally found that
players have a tendency to reciprocate, and this behaviour becomes more pronounced as
the game progresses, i.e., it takes time for a reciprocal relationship to develop, whereas in-
group favouritism is more immediate. The ability to detect reciprocation is only possible
by modelling the interactions between individuals as we have done in this paper.
Interestingly, the estimated group and reciprocity effects are quite similar across 3 of
the 4 games. However, one of the games produced quite different results from the rest. We
showed that this was mainly due to two players from different groups who reciprocated
with each other for most rounds of the game (albeit there were other high-reciprocating
players in that game). Our model-based influence metric identified these individuals as
being unusual, i.e., their behaviour (high reciprocation with an outgroup member) was
much different from the average behaviour in that game. When these two players were
removed from the data the results of the model were much more similar to results from
the other games. Our visualisation of the network of players complements the output
from the linear model, as it indicates the contribution of individual players to the overall
dynamics estimated by the model.
We note that our suggested influence metric (for detecting individuals differing from
the norm) could be used to detect anomalous individuals in various settings. One topical
example of this type of application is bot detection on Twitter, where the focus is on
determining user accounts that display unusual behavioural patterns [11]. It would be
interesting to apply the approach to such data to determine whether or not bot accounts
are indeed identified, and visualise the network as per Fig. 11; such information could
complement other methods currently employed for bot identification [25].
While developed for VIAPPL data, this methodology can be used for any kind of
social interaction data, and, of course, these interactions need not be “token exchange”
(this is just the social interaction mechanism within the VIAPPL platform.) Our proposed
approach does not impose distributional assumptions on the error terms, nor independence
of observations, which is useful when these standard modelling assumptions are not met.
The use of a null model makes this approach particularly suited to scenarios where the
data is produced according to some rule-based process, for example, in iterated prisoner’s
dilemma experiments in game theory [1]. However, this does not prevent its use in other
settings once a suitable agent-based model (see [16, 3, 4]) is defined for the scenario under
study.
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